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Patients are increasingly being asked for feedback about their healthcare experiences. However,
healthcare staff often ﬁnd it difﬁcult to act on this feedback in order to make improvements to services.
This paper draws upon notions of legitimacy and readiness to develop a conceptual framework (Patient
Feedback Response Framework e PFRF) which outlines why staff may ﬁnd it problematic to respond to
patient feedback.
A large qualitative study was conducted with 17 ward based teams between 2013 and 2014, across
three hospital Trusts in the North of England. This was a process evaluation of a wider study where ward
staff were encouraged to make action plans based on patient feedback. We focus on three methods here:
i) examination of taped discussion between ward staff during action planning meetings ii) facilitators
notes of these meetings iii) telephone interviews with staff focusing on whether action plans had been
achieved six months later. Analysis employed an abductive approach.
Through the development of the PFRF, we found that making changes based on patient feedback is a
complex multi-tiered process and not something that ward staff can simply ‘do’. First, staff must exhibit
normative legitimacy e the belief that listening to patients is a worthwhile exercise. Second, structural
legitimacy has to be in place e ward teams need adequate autonomy, ownership and resource to enact
change. Some ward teams are able to make improvements within their immediate control and envi-
ronment. Third, for those staff who require interdepartmental co-operation or high level assistance to
achieve change, organisational readiness must exist at the level of the hospital otherwise improvement
will rarely be enacted. Case studies drawn from our empirical data demonstrate the above. It is only
when appropriate levels of individual and organisational capacity to change exist, that patient feedback
is likely to be acted upon to improve services.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The last decade has witnessed an explosion in the collection of
feedback from patients about their opinion of healthcare services
throughout many countries across the world. This activity had
largely taken place in the United States, Europe (particularly the
UK) and Australia (Davidson et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2015;th Research, Bradford Teach-
ited Kingdom.
rd).
Ltd. This is an open access article uGleeson et al., 2016). The methods used can be both quantitative
and qualitative and range from the level of large, national surveys
through to the micro level of local patient narratives of their
journey through the hospital system (Health Foundation, 2013).
Other methods of gathering patient feedback may include: focus
groups with patients, patient panels, ofﬁcial complaints and com-
pliments, feedback delivered in real time via postcards or electronic
kiosks, postal and online surveys. Recently, social media and web-
sites such as Patient Opinion in the UK allow patients to give
feedback in an unsolicited manner. Patient feedback through all the
above channels, and many more besides, can relate to several
important aspects of a patient’s care; most noticeably patientnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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experience in hospital are: efﬁcient processes, good clinical out-
comes, the physical environment, how patients felt about the care
they received and how staff interacted with them (NHS
Confederation, 2010). A growing international body of evidence
suggests that patient experience, safety and clinical effectiveness
are inextricably linked (Doyle et al., 2013).
Despite the wealth of feedback now available to healthcare
services, there is little evidence that this feedback has led to
improvement in the quality of healthcare (Coulter et al., 2014). A
review of the UK National Inpatient Survey concluded that “simply
providing hospitals with patient feedback does not automatically
have a positive effect on quality standards” (DeCourcy et al., 2012).
Yet, there appears to be an assumption that merely giving staff
feedback from their patients will drive ward based improvements
(Reeves et al., 2013), with the complexity of how hospital staff
manage to turn feedback into concrete improvements largely
neglected. Indeed, the emphasis until recently has been on data
collection in and of itself rather than data being used to improve the
quality of care (Reeves et al., 2013).
Several reasons may explain why change could be difﬁcult for
clinical staff to achieve in relation to working on issues which pa-
tients have identiﬁed. Using data sources to change practice de-
mands creativity and skills from staff whomay have had little or no
training in quality improvement and currently there is a tendency
to present staff with data and expect change to happen as a result
(Gkeredakis et al., 2011). Clinicians may be mistrustful of the data,
defensive, merely lack interest (Asprey et al., 2013) or may not wish
to claim issues as their own (Robert and Cornwell, 2013). Cornwell
(2015) writes that improvement work based on patient experience
data often draws attention to the attitudes and behaviours of
frontline staff, which can cause anxiety amongst individuals. Until
recently, there has been an unspoken but widely held belief by
some healthcare professionals that providing a good patient
experience is considered perhaps a luxury or ‘nice but not neces-
sary’ (NHS Confederation, 2010).
At the level of the healthcare organisation, meso and macro
factors come into play which may explainwhy it is difﬁcult to enact
change based on patient feedback. Dixon-Woods et al. (2013)
articulate the difference between ‘problem sensing’ and ‘comfort
seeking’ behaviours by hospitals. Problem sensing involves seeking
out weaknesses in organisational systems by making use of mul-
tiple sources of data, including soft intelligence. Comfort seeking
requires reassurance that all is well and that the organisation looks
‘good’ externally. When a hospital organisation tips towards com-
fort seeking behaviours, “data collection activities were prone to
being treated by sharp end staff as wearisome and fruitless
accountability exercises”. The relationship between how frontline
ward staff and executive board members consider patient feedback
is said to be problematic in some organisations. A focus on surveys
and targets may have “contributed to a tick box or compliance
mentality” lulling hospital boards into thinking they were paying
attention to patient experience (Robert and Cornwell, 2013) when
the situation on the ground is somewhat different. Furthermore,
there is said to be a ‘chasm’ between hospital management and
frontline clinicians with the former investing heavily in providing
the means to collect patient feedback but providing little structure
in how the latter can act on this data to improve patient experience
(Rozenblum et al., 2013). It has been said that an ever growing
battery of targets, tools, metrics and inspections simply allows or-
ganisations to measure how compassionate their staff are rather
than the task of changing the culture to enablemore compassionate
care to be delivered (Locock et al., 2014). Expansion of metrics to
measure quality, safety and experience could become counterpro-
ductive with the unintended consequence being that they “addmore to the noise without amplifying the signal” (Martin et al.,
2015).
In this paper, we bring together three linked concepts which
have previously been employed in the theoretical literature on
institutional change in healthcare and more broadly in organisa-
tional sociology. These are: normative legitimacy (NL), structural
legitimacy (SL) and organisational readiness (OR). We sought out
conceptualisations of the link between the actions of individuals
with their wider organisational context, and theways inwhich they
may navigate this complexity. We were interested in this link
because the growing agenda for patient feedback to be used to
improve services is not necessarily supported by healthcare orga-
nisations' dominant procedures and processes (Rozenblum et al.,
2013). Equally, interventions designed to promote patient experi-
ence, quality and safety may often be targeted at speciﬁc in-
dividuals or groups to lead on, but ultimately they seek to effect
change at a whole-system level, requiring cooperation between
actors in different, often quite disparate parts of a healthcare
organisation (Benn et al., 2009).
We looked to emerging interpretations of institutional theory to
assist us. Macfarlane et al. (2013) states that the tendency in
institutional theory has previously been overly deterministic,
focusing on the inﬂuence of structure at the expense of individual
agency, so that the structure exerts a particular logic and in-
dividuals will seek to maintain this status quo. With the advent of
concepts such as ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Battilana et al.,
2009), there is recognition that some individuals are not conﬁned
by the status quo, and do attempt to transform their organisations
fromwithin. Macfarlane welcomes the application by Lockett et al.
(2012) of this concept to healthcare and their use of the concepts of
legitimacy to understand the behaviour of individuals with respect
to transforming their own contexts and institutionalising new
agendas which they support. Lockett et al argue that a subject's
position in an institution will vary depending on two types of
'legitimacy' that they hold. The ﬁrst is their 'normative legitimacy'
(NL) which Lockett deﬁnes as a “moral orientation being based on
the ability to convince others of ‘what ought to be’ or ‘what is the
right thing to do”'. The second is their 'structural legitimacy' (SL)
relating to “the power that emanates from professional hierarchy
and jurisdiction” and this element will affect a subject’s chances of
effecting change. We note that Lockett’s use of these concepts is a
divergence from the original offering of Suchman (1995) who
introduced concepts of legitimacy to organisational studies in order
to understand whether or not the actions of an organisation as a
whole are viewed as socially acceptable within dominant societal
structures and norms. For our purposes, it is Lockett's application to
the individuals within organisations that we draw upon in order to
begin to unpick where action for change arises within our case
study.
Lockett's proposal goes someway to understanding the behav-
iour of individuals and how their actions relate to the context they
ﬁnd themselves in. However, we believe that an additional layer
can be added to enhance understanding of the relationship be-
tween an individual subject’s position and the organisation as a
whole. This especially relates to understanding the link between
multiple members of an organisation (often from different di-
visions/ services) who need to come together collectively for a
cross-department agenda such as improving patient experience.
We propose that Weiner's (2009) conceptualisation of ‘organisa-
tional readiness to change’ (OR) is helpful here. This refers to the
extent to which there is a collective, or shared “resolve to pursue
the courses of action involved in change implementation”.
Crucially, this collective resolve needs to be perceived as such by
whoever is leading the change - they need to believe they will ﬁnd
support to be effective in their efforts.
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understand change effort relating to the ability of individuals and
teams to generate action in response to patient experience feed-
back. We believe that bringing these three distinct, yet related,
concepts together can help reveal the complexity resident in how
healthcare staff try to (and do) respond to patient feedback. We
recognise that application of these concepts to assist understanding
of our empirical ﬁndings is still in its infancy so we take care to
deﬁne our interpretations which may be different to others. It is
worth noting that whilst NL and SL have been used together before
to understand individuals’ actions (Lockett et al., 2012), the three
concepts of NL, SL and OR have not been e to our knowledge -
conceptually entwined previously. Our interpretations of how each
concept can be used to identify different inﬂuences at play are
detailed in Table 1. Distinctly, we acknowledge that our con-
ceptualisation of SL may be slightly different to that of Lockett’s
which is ﬁrmly rooted in the consequences of one’s professional
and hierarchical position within an organisation. We are more
interested in ideas around the availability of autonomy, ownership
and resource, which we will outline in full later.
We recognise the seminal institutional work of Scott et al.
(2000) in ensuring that organisations cannot be fully understood
in isolation from the external inﬂuences arising from a wider
'institutional ﬁeld' of regulation and continuing political shifts be-
tween actor groups. Analyses of these inﬂuences on organisational
activity are certainly worthy of exploration in their own right but
are beyond the scope of our study.
We take the above concepts and embed them in an empirically
derived multi-component, multi-faceted framework which theo-
rises the necessary conditions essential to allowing ward staff to
effectively respond to patient feedback (Fig. 1). We have called this
the ‘Patient Feedback Response Framework’ (PFRF). The empirical
data arose from a process evaluation of a large scale randomised
controlled trial of a complex patient safety intervention - Patient
Reporting and Action for a Safe Environment (PRASE) (Lawton et al.,
2017; Sheard et al., 2017 in press). Our aim in this paper is to un-
derstand why hospital staff may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to respond to
feedback about safety, quality and experience from their own pa-
tients. We consider explanations where we actively seek to scru-
tinise and problematise the interplay between the individual and
the organisational level through a broad theoretical account.
2. Method
We conducted a large qualitative study with 17 ward based
teams across three UK hospital Trusts in the North of England. A
hospital ‘Trust’ is an organisation that provides secondary health
care services to a locality within the English National Health Service
system. The study was part of a process evaluation of a randomised
controlled trial of a patient safety intervention. The methods of the
process evaluation have been described in detail elsewhere (Sheard
et al., 2014), as have the process evaluation ﬁndings (Sheard et al.,
2017 in press) and the results of the trial (Lawton et al., 2017). WeTable 1
Theoretical and empirical deﬁnitions of each concept.
Theoretical deﬁnition Appli
NL “Moral in orientation, being based on the ability to convince others of ‘what
ought to be’ or ‘what is the right thing to do’” (Lockett et al, 2012)
Staff
feedb
SL “the power that emanates from professional hierarchy and jurisdiction”
(Lockett et al, 2012)
Staff p
in ord
OR There is a collective, or shared “resolve to pursue the courses of action
involved in change implementation” at the organisational level (Weiner,
2009)
Meso
achie
Macr
systeprovide a synopsis of the intervention in Box 1 for the reader to be
able to view our current paper in context. Brieﬂy, the intervention
centred on gathering patient feedback about safety on theward and
feeding this data back to ward staff via a structured ‘feedback
report’. Staff then considered this information in an action planning
meeting (APM) and were facilitated to make improvements based
on the patient feedback. When reference is made to a ‘facilitator’ of
the APM, the person undertaking this role was always a senior
member of the research team. The above activities took place in
two phases, spaced six months apart.
Three methods were utilised for this paper:
 Critical examination of the APM voice ﬁles
 Facilitator’s ﬁeld notes about the APM
 Follow up telephone interviews six months post APM
Data collection occurred between August 2013 and November
2014. Ethical approval was secured in March 2013. All participants
gave informed consent to take part in this study. We draw upon
qualitative data from both phases of the study e two sets of APMs
and two sets of telephone interviews, per ward. A key member of
staff e one for each of the 17 wards in the intervention arm ewas
asked to form an action planning group consisting of a range of staff
members from that ward, whowould then take part in an APM. The
average number of people in a group was four although in several
instances the facilitator met with only one person. The largest
group consisted of nine people. Nurses were the majority of par-
ticipants with a smaller input from medical staff, allied health
professionals and support staff. In the ﬁrst phase of action planning,
63 staff were involved and in the second phase 38 staff. More detail
on each unit of analysis is given below:
Critical examination of APM voice ﬁles - APMs were digitally
recorded for all 17wards at both phases. At phase two, oneward did
not meet so we considered the recordings of 33 APMs (27 to 80
minutes, average ¼ 43 minutes). Our examination focused on
which areas of patient feedback the staff chose tomake action plans
on and which areas they chose not to take forward. The rationale
behind these decisions were of key interest. We wrote detailed
notes whilst listening to the whole voice ﬁle and noted verbatim
comments, as warranted.
Facilitator’s ﬁeld notes - Written shortly after each APM had
taken place, they sought to capture: i) implicit dynamics between
staff, ii) the environment, iii) the facilitator’s immediate reaction to
themeeting. Field notes tended to be brief and were devised to give
a ‘snapshot’ of the meeting from the facilitator’s perspective.
Follow up telephone interviews conducted with the APM lead - The
purpose was to ascertain whether action plans had been success-
fully implemented or not. They were conducted around six months
after the APM had been held with the ward ‘PRASE lead’ (usually a
senior nurse), in both phases of the study. In the ﬁrst phase, two
wards (out of 17 intervention wards) declined to take part in the
phone interview but all wards took part in the second phase,
leading to a dataset of 32 interviews. The phone interviews werecation to our empirical data
members express a personal belief in the importance of responding to patient
ack and a desire to act.
erceive they have sufﬁcient ownership, autonomy and resource available to them
er to establish a coherent plan of action in response to patient feedback
level OR - the capacity for inter-departmental working and collaboration to
ve improvement.
o level OR - the capacity in which senior hospital management and the high level
ms of the organisation support and facilitate ward staff to work on improvement.
Figure 1. Patient Feedback Response Framework.
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interviews began by proceeding through each action point made,
asking about implementation. The context of why or why not an
action plan had been implemented was of critical importance.Box 1
Intervention synopsis.For the purposes of this paper, we re-analysed the data gathered
for the original process evaluation and chose to concentrate on
examining it in relation to the three concepts in the Patient Feed-
back Response Framework described previously: normative
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became interested in applying the literature from organisational
sociology after noticing that the three concepts seemed to intui-
tively make sense of what our data was telling us. We took an
abductive approach to analysis (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012)
which involves iterative cycles of analytical interpretation between
the literature and empirical data in order to construct theory.
Taking an abductive approach involves engaging in “imaginative
thinking about intriguing ﬁndings and then return[ing] to the ﬁeld
to check our conjectures” (Charmaz, 2009). One speciﬁc aim of this
approach is to generate novel theoretical insights which reframe
empirical ﬁndings in contrast to existing theories (Timmermans
and Tavory, 2012). Existing theory can be thought of as a heuristic
tool in order to take ideas beyond the data itself (Coffey and
Atkinson, 1996).
LS and CM held an intense analysis sessionwhere we focused on
testing pertinent case studies from our empirical data by mapping
these onto where they sat in relation to the three concepts, to see if
our preliminary framework was justiﬁed and to guard against un-
substantiated retroﬁtting. This exercise strengthened both our
framework and our understanding of how our data related to the
literature. Furthermore, it allowed us to further deﬁne and hone our
own understanding of the three concepts e and how they are
linked - in relation to the data which was in front of us. We decided
that, to provide rigour, once we had arrived at an outline frame-
work we would return to our empirical data and code the data
sources described above based on the three concepts. We did this
initial coding in a traditional manner, creating grids of data which
gathered all the evidence pertaining to the main action planning
activity of an individual ward from the differing data sources of the
process evaluation. With the abundance of empirical data in front
of us, we then ascribed a summative assessment of where indi-
vidual wards sat in relation to the three concepts of NL, SL and OR.
3. Findings
Our ﬁndings are presented in three main sections. The ﬁrst
section e normative legitimacy e examines whether staff believe
there is a moral case for listening to and acting on patient feedback
about safety. Second, the section on structural legitimacy explores
whether staff believe they are in a position to be able to respond to
feedback. That is, whether they have the adequate autonomy,
ownership and resource to believe they can enact change. Finally,
the third section observes whether the wider organisation was
ready to facilitate change on behalf of the ward staff. A summary of
the ﬁndings is detailed in Table 2 so the reader can see the classi-
ﬁcation of the whole dataset at a glance. We elaborate on all of the
above by providing explanatory cases from the data. We depart
from the usual qualitative tradition of providing excerpts of direct
quotations from individual participants in order to allow for the
meta level of analysis to be portrayed effectively. This approach
avoids privileging speciﬁc data sources when our intention is for
the analysis of all data sources to exist and be presented as a holistic
representation. Instead, we offer illustrative case study examples
pertaining to ward teams, all developed frommultiple data sources
described in the Methods section. All ward names and names of
individuals are pseudonyms.
3.1. Stage one of PFRF: normative legitimacy
The majority of ward teams were open and receptive to
receiving feedback from their patients and genuinely wanted to
make improvements to the ward based on this data. Some teams
spontaneously mentioned during the APM to the facilitator that
they were “excited” about receiving the patient feedback andcouldn’t wait to start responding to the issues which their patients
had raised. Throughout, there was a sense that listening to patients
and acting on issues they had raised was ‘the right thing to do’ and
that the staff really wanted to make authentic improvements.
Members of Willow and Holly wards were striking in their
commitment to acting on patient feedback in that several staff
members attended the APM on their day off. The characteristics of
teams who had sufﬁcient NL tended to be: A multidisciplinary
group, who had all read the feedback report prior to the APM, had
thought carefully about its contents and had allowed themselves
time and space to discuss patient feedback arising from the report
and how they were going to act on this in a considered manner.
These teams tended to appreciate what the research team were
trying to achieve and the purpose and ethos of the study, as they
themselves already had a ﬁrm commitment to the patient voice. Of
the 17 intervention wards, we have classiﬁed 11 ward teams as
having NL although the extent to which this matches the descrip-
tion above pertains to nineward teamswith the other two (Oak and
Juniper) engaged with NL in a more restricted manner. These two
teams, whilst on the surface seemingly engaged in the moral
imperative to respond to patient feedback, often discussed the
report in a ‘clinician knows best’manner. For both teams, responses
to the patient data were ﬁrmly entrenched in a rhetoric of ‘man-
aging patient expectations’ rather than seeking to tackle the un-
derlying issue at hand which patients had raised.
Of the remaining six ward teams, four (Elm, Cherry, Rowan and
Birch) can be classiﬁed as having minimal or zero NL throughout
the life course of the study whilst a further two (Maple and Pine)
hadminimal or zero in phase one but then began to understand the
importance of listening to patient feedback and came to embrace
this approach in phase two. For the former group, research facili-
tators were often met with hostility. A defensive stance was taken
by ward staff when asked to consider the patient feedback in the
APM coupled with concerns about who else had access to the data,
despite reassurance the data was conﬁdential to the individual
ward. Elm ward in particular encapsulates this approach as when
asked to consider the patient feedback data for their ward, staff
members became irritated about comments which patients had
made and dismissed the feedback as irrelevant. The facilitator left
the APM feeling deﬂated and demoralised about the attitude of staff
towards the feedback.
The two ward teams who began with minimal NL in phase one
but proceeded to sufﬁcient NL in phase two (Maple and Pine) are of
particular interest as they show that NL is not necessarily static and
can change in a relatively short space of time e around six months
in this case. The reasonswhy they changed their stance are complex
although one discernible reason relates to their respective ward
managers not seeing any value in acting on patient feedback. A key
turning point for both managers of these wards e despite them
being at different hospital Trusts - appears to be the Mid-Point
Meeting (described in Box 1) where they heard their nursing
peers in other wards attest to the implicit value of listening to and
acting on the patient voice.
Overall, it is reassuring to see that the majority of ward teams
did have sufﬁcient NL capacity and actively strived to act on patient
feedback. The four teams who had minimal or zero NL largely fell
down at this stage and failed to enact action plans which would
beneﬁt their patients. We now turn our attention to the next
concept in our framework: structural legitimacy.
3.2. Stage 2 of PFRF: structural legitimacy
Based on our empirical data, we propose that SL consists of three
inter-related concepts. Staff must perceive that they have a sufﬁ-
cient amount of each in order for them to be able to act on patient
Table 2
Summary of ﬁndings.
Ward Hospital Trust Normative legitimacy Structural legitimacy Organisational readiness
Phase one Phase two Phase one Phase two Phase one Phase two
Beech A Yes Yes No No - -
Elm A No No - - - -
Maple A No Yes - Yes - Yes
Oak A Yes Yes Yes No No -
Cherry B No No - - - -
Apple B Yes Yes Yes No No -
Holly B Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Willow B Yes Yes Yes Yes No Action plan did not need OR to complete
Pine B No Yes - No - -
Rowan C No No - - - -
Birch C No No - - - -
Sycamore C Yes Yes Yes Yes Action plan did not need OR to complete Action plan did not need OR to complete
Hawthorn C Yes Yes Yes Yes Action plan did not need OR to complete No
Poplar C Yes Yes Yes Yes Action plan did not need OR to complete No
Chestnut C Yes Yes No No - -
Juniper C Yes Yes No No - -
Linden C Yes Yes Yes Yes Action plan did not need OR to complete Action plan did not need OR to complete
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 autonomy - freedom from external control or having free will to
act on an issue (“it’s ok for me to carry out this action plan
without having to check with the matron”)
 ownership - the state and/or right to possess something (“this is
my issue or problem to deal with”)
 resource e sufﬁcient sources of (and freedom of) ﬁnance, time
and logistical commitment to enable change to happen.
We focus this ﬁndings section on the rationale behind why staff
did or did not perceive they had sufﬁcient SL to enact change based
on patient feedback. Nearly all of the 17 ward teams for both phases
of the study ﬁt into three distinct responses concerning SL. First, we
saw that sufﬁcient SL was demonstrated when the change which
staff sought to enact was perceived as being within their own
control and it related only to the environment or systems of the
individual ward on which they worked. That is, ownership and
autonomy were strong with little or no resource required. Second,
one of the main reasons why SL was not present within some ward
teams relates to a lack of ownership of the initial problem either
related to staff ﬂux or a demoralised workforce. Third, some teams
proceeded determinedly with their action plans but were set back
or blocked by meso-level organisational factors. Usually, they
needed assistance from others external to the ward but this was
often not forthcoming and the collective ethos needed to solve a
problem did not exist.We have not classiﬁedward teams in relation
to SL based on whether their action plan was achieved or not as we
believe it to be tautological to ascribe a retrospective assignment of
a team’s belief about their capacity to enact change based on the
end result. It is the ‘why’ behind what helped or hindered their
implementation of action plans which we are interested in here.
For the analysis of SL in phase one, 11 out of 17 ward teams were
considered and in phase two this amounts to 13 out of 17 teams.We
excluded those who did not demonstrate sufﬁcient NL from our SL
analysis. Out of the 11 ward teams in phase one, it appears that the
majority (eight) can be classiﬁed as believing they had sufﬁcient SL.
Four made changes within their direct control and the other four
sought to make wider changes but were set back by organisational
factors. The other three ward teams could not tackle a problem
raised by their patients from the start as they lacked ownership of
it. Out of the 13 teams we considered in phase two, slightly less
than half (six) believed they had sufﬁcient SL with three making
changes within their control and the other three being thwarted by
organisational factors. Most of the rest of this phase two cohort(ﬁve teams) lacked ownership of the problem from the offset.
Maple (in phase two), bucks the above classiﬁcations as signiﬁcant
external resource and collaborative working were required to
achieve change but the wider organisation responded positively to
achieve this. (See Table 2 for a visual summary). We now proceed to
discuss the three ﬁndings in more detail with relevant case studies
drawn from the empirical data.
SL is high when the improvement is within the control of staff
initiating it ewe can see that when staff sought to make changes to
the structures or processes of the individual ward on which they
worked, this often led to success. This amounted to four ward teams
in phase one and three in phase two. In fact, very few actions based
on patient feedback fell down when the change (however great)
was conﬁned to amending the systems or processes of one ward.
This was often because ownership and autonomy to solve an issue
was high, especially for senior nursing staff. An example of this
comes fromHawthornward in phase one. They decided to alter and
extend their visiting hours to the ward in order to prevent a rush of
relatives requesting information at the same time. The standard
visiting hours had previously been 2pm to 4pm and then 6pm to
8pme as was traditional acrossmost of the rest of the hospital - but
Hawthorn staff changed them to 2pm to 8pm. The members of staff
involved in this action plan considered it “radical” as it was a major
change to the structural workings and processes of the ward. Yet,
the necessary autonomy and ownership to make this change exis-
ted in the action planning group. Additionally, very little resource
was required to make this change happen.
The other types of action plans which staff made which were
within their control sometimes related to modifying the role of a
staff member in order to beneﬁt patient experience. This related to
three ward teams across both phases. The team on Poplar ward
were concerned that their patients had reported they were frus-
trated by conﬂicting information being given about the discharge
process. They decided to modify the role of the discharge nurse so
that dedicated time was given to each patient to discuss discharge
and e most importantly e patients were kept informed if their
discharge was going to be delayed. As before, autonomy and
ownership to implement this improvement was high but no
resource was required. The ward manager stated in the follow up
interview six months later that complaints about the discharge
process had reduced and the ward team believed this was directly
attributable to the action plan instigated.
SL is low when there is lack of ownership about the problem - this
relates to three teams in phase one and ﬁve in phase two. Lack of
ownership can be divided into two distinct reasons: 1) the change
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demoralised approach to action planning. Staff ﬂux in this context
means a high movement of ward staff around the NHS estate. That
is, ward teams being signiﬁcantly restructured or staff leaving their
role to work on another ward within the same hospital or at a
different hospital. Sometimes, staff who left were not replaced or
recruitment to replace them was unsuccessful. Equally, new team
members may have arrived and were not expected to take part in
action planning about long standing issues. This movement of staff
during the life course of the study was much higher than the
research team had anticipated.
Staff ﬂux is a serious problem when it comes to a team of ward
staff taking ownership of an action plan and seeing it through to
completion. The reasons are that one team member would some-
times take responsibility to initiate an action plan but completion of
that work then fell down if that person permanently left the ward
environment. We found little evidence of action plans being dele-
gated appropriately for other staff to complete them. In times of
change and uncertainty around stafﬁng levels, some wards
focussed their attention on direct patient care and decided to re-
turn to improvement initiatives once the core team had been
strengthened. For a few teams who were under signiﬁcant stress,
the action plan was inappropriately delegated to a more junior
member of staff who lacked the ownership of the problem and also
the necessary autonomy to solve it. We can see that staff ﬂux is a
problem on Chestnut and Juniper wards in phase one and Pine and
Juniper wards again in phase two.
The second reason ward teams lacked ownership of an issue
relates to a demoralised approach to action planning. This was
evident in phase two on Oak and Apple wards and to a lesser extent
on Juniper ward. Demoralisation in phase two is directly related to
the team’s prior experience of making action plans in phase one of
the study which were then hindered in some manner and pre-
vented from coming to fruition. For the above teams, action plan-
ning in phase two therefore sometimes felt like ‘going through the
motions’ with the action planning team agreeing to meet with the
researcher but the meeting concentrating on prior frustrations and
new patient feedback being considered in a lacklustre manner. It is
useful to note that not all teams who were thwarted in phase one
action planning reacted in a demoralised manner in phase two.
SL is hindered by inadequate organisational workingewhenward
staff tried to instigate meso-level change which involved actors
external to the individual ward environment, action planning often
became problematic. This classiﬁcation applies to four ward teams
in phase one and three in phase two. Difﬁculties arose when the
proposed improvement required any of the following: negotiation
with external contractors, the approval of committees, extensive
input or assistance from another department/ service and struc-
tural changes at the level of the whole organisation. Of interest,
these difﬁculties were sometimes not related to how far reaching
the change appeared to be with relatively simple improvements
being thwarted by a lack of collaborative working on the part of
other departments or services elsewhere in the hospital. Ward
teams in this classiﬁcation believed they had sufﬁcient SL but were
effectively being blocked by inadequate organisational readiness to
change (OR), which is the next component of our framework.
At this juncture, we take forward into the analysis those teams
who had their action planning thwarted by insufﬁcient OR (seven
across both phases) to unpick why this occurred. We also discuss
the case of Maple ward who were the only ward team to achieve
change which relied on extensive collaboration and resource
outside of the individual ward environment. We leave behind the
majority of ward teams: those where SL was high and their action
plan did not depend on OR to succeed and also those who lacked
ownership of the problem, therefore SL was low to begin with.3.3. Stage 3 of PFRF: organisational readiness
The ability for ward teamswith a perceived sense of SL to be able
to realise change is inextricably linked to whether OR exists at the
level of the organisation (the hospital Trust) and in turn whether
OR facilitates the change staff wish to make. This can be broken
down into meso OR and macro OR. Meso OR refers to the capacity
for inter-departmental working and collaboration to achieve
improvement. Macro OR refers to the capacity in which senior
hospital management and the high level systems of the organisa-
tion support and facilitate ward staff to work on improvement.
OR at the meso level of inter-departmental working was poor
for most of the teams who tried to instigate change where it
depended on the buy in of others external to the individual ward.
For instance, staff on Apple ward needed assistance from the
pharmacy department in order to change procedures around
controlled drug dispensing and they could not complete their ac-
tion planwithout this help. Yet the pharmacy department were not
willing to help their colleagues on Apple ward to achieve this
change. Similarly, the Holly ward team wanted to improve
communication between theatre staff andward staff but found that
theatre management were not interested in assisting the ward to
achieve this. Other teams found their action plans hindered by
macro OR processes which curtailed effective action planning due
to inﬂexibility and bureaucracy. Willow ward team wanted to
physically alter part of the ward environment but found that there
was a complicated hierarchy of estates and leaseholders to gain
approval from before work could begin. In a different manner, but
still resident at the level of macro OR, staff on Oakward found that a
leaﬂet theywrote had stalled for several months with the hospital’s
‘reading panel’ and had not been implemented six months after it
was written. Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of
macro OR preventing an action plan being realised is that of Poplar
ward in phase two. Ward staff worked hard to implement an action
plan which sought to prevent a noisy and too bright assessment
area being used as an extra bed bay during high occupancy periods.
They were blocked by hospital management who repeatedly
declined their attempts to make the improvement.
Our discordant case is that of the Maple ward team. This team
had tacit knowledge over a long period of time that there were not
enough nursing staff on a night shift but it was difﬁcult to prove this
by virtue of anecdote alone. The PRASE data showed that ﬁve
separate patients had reported to researchers e over a three week
data collection period e that they had waited a signiﬁcantly long
time for staff to answer their call buzzer and this had compromised
patient experience and safety. Critically, this most often related to
patients becoming incontinent as a result of needing assistance
with toileting and no staff being available to perform this. The ward
manager wanted an extra qualiﬁed nurse for three nights a week in
order to address these problems and the Maple team made an ac-
tion plan to achieve this. The ward manager reported these con-
cerns to the corporate nursing department (via an electronic
systemwhich records patient safety incidents) and escalated them
to the hospital board. Senior management responded to this and
authorised the ward manager to go over budget to ensure there
were three qualiﬁed nurses every night. This is a clear example
where macro OR was present and assisted in achieving concrete
improvements for patients.
4. Discussion
Through a consideration of the empirical data and the resultant
formulation of the Patient Feedback Response Framework (Fig. 1),
we can see that effecting change based on patient feedback relies
heavily on sufﬁcient NL, SL and OR being present in relation to the
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PFRF. Without the moral imperative to listen to the patient voice,
improvement rarely takes place. The second component of the PFRF
is SL, where staff must have sufﬁcient autonomy, ownership and
resource in relation to a problem in order to enact change. Where
SL is high, the desired change is within control of the staff and
wholly within the environment of the ward they work on then
action plans are likely to be successfully implemented. When SL is
low, we identiﬁed that there is a lack of ownership of a problem and
this most often pertains to staff ﬂux or demoralisation with action
plans failing to be initiated. In some instances, action planning gets
underway and staff believe they have SL but the wider organisa-
tional working to achieve change (OR) is not sufﬁcient to enable
change to occur. The third component of our framework is OR,
which can be divided into the meso (inter-departmental collegiate
working) and macro (high level system support for change) levels.
Insufﬁcient OR usually blocks action planning even for wards which
are high in SL.
It is useful to consider the interplay and relationships between
the levels of the framework in order to develop our understanding
of the myriad of contextual issues at play. Sufﬁcient levels of NL and
SL are needed in order for change to proceed but some action plans
do occur without the need for OR. It is interesting to see that suf-
ﬁciency of NL may bear no relation to the capacity for SL which
actors have. Whilst it would be intuitive to believe that the two are
perhaps related, our analysis has shown that minimal SL can exist
evenwhen NL is high. That is, an ethical imperative to pay attention
to and listen to the patient voice does not instil the necessary in situ
conditions for improvement to happen. This failure of successful
transition between NL and SL is an important element of the
inability of ward staff to respond to patient feedback.
Equally as problematic is the relationship between SL and OR
and the dependency which some action plans have on OR being in
place even when SL to achieve the change is very high. When
looking at the types of action plans which ward staff attempted to
make, we can see two clear trends: changes made only to the ward
processes which were under direct control of the action planning
team or changes which sought wider external support at a sys-
tematic level. The former succeeded and the latter usually failed. In
the current movement for continuous quality improvement within
healthcare, ward staff are being asked to perform an onerous task
when the wider organisational support or working is insufﬁcient to
be able to assist them in their improvement goals. Indeed,
Rozenblum et al. (2013) describes a patient feedback ‘chasm’ be-
tween hospital managers and frontline clinicians whereby man-
agers invest heavily inmeasuring patient feedback but have little or
no plans for how to facilitate staff to enact subsequent improve-
ment. We believe there needs to be less concentration by senior
management on the formal metrics and targets of individual wards
and an increased fostering of a culture where interdisciplinary and
inter-departmental working is encouraged and rewarded. Large
parts of hospital organisations are working in silos, each trying to
respond individually to patient feedback, when patient care and
experience would be signiﬁcantly improved if these actors came
together in a collaborative working arrangement. As Burnett et al.
(2010) have commented, effective integration of parallel improve-
ment activities is vital to reduce the ‘improvement strain’ on staff.
Likewise, it is beginning to be perceived as unethical to ask
patients to give feedback if little or nothing will be acted upon
(Coulter et al., 2014). Given the knowledge gained from our
empirical work, we believe that until ward staff are given robust
organisational support to implement changes then the value of
Trusts collecting patient feedback is questionable. This speaks to
both the unethical nature of asking patients to feedback without
subsequent change occurring but also the demoralising effect onstaff when they try to make changes to improve patient care but
become thwarted and stymied in the process of doing this. We saw
empirical evidence of this when SL was low due to previous failed
attempts at action planning. When staff attempt system level
changes which repeatedly ﬂounder, future efforts may then be
directed towards small scale immediate improvements within the
actor’s control. This does more than merely hinder the original
issue at hand and becomes a broader concern about the inability of
individuals to successfully enact change. Tucker et al. (2002) argue
that problem solving behaviours which focus solely on overcoming
immediate obstacles prevent organisational learning. In part, this is
because short term success limits motivation to remove the un-
derlying causes of problems. Indeed, some of the changes we saw
enacted in our studywere often centred on providing ‘quick ﬁxes’e
immediate solutions to concrete problems. Whilst some of these
were entirely appropriate as a solution to the problem in hand,
others were not. In many organisations, an adequate SL and OR
culture e coming together to achieve change - needs creating and
sustaining. However, as Power et al. (2016) have noted, change
initiatives are difﬁcult to embed in times of ‘structural turbulence’
which the NHS is currently living through. In a climate of ‘do more
with less’, and considerable constraint on the NHS budget, fostering
of an effective SL and OR culture is unlikely to be achieved even in
the medium term future.
Yet, some staff are able toworkwithin the system in order to use
it to theire and their patients' - advantage. These people have been
described as “institutional entrepreneurs” (Battilana et al., 2009) as
they are more likely than others to see and act on opportunities for
institutional change. We found several examples of these people
during our analysis e such as the ward manager on Maple ward e
but they consisted of a minority of ward staff. Entrepreneurship in
this regard often centred on strengthening elements of SL within
their grasp (mostly in relation to the ward itself) in order to beneﬁt
patient care. Understanding the motivations of these people and
how they operate may be critical in unpicking what are the
essential elements of SL which lead to fruitful change based on
patient feedback.
4.1. Limitations
Some ward teams changed over the course of the study in
relation to where they sat in terms of NL and SL and their corre-
sponding sufﬁciency here. We have tried to encapsulate this
throughout the ﬁndings section by clearly demarcating the wards
that changed their ethos. For instance, two wards progressed from
minimal NL in phase one to sufﬁcient NL in phase two. Deﬁning
why and how teams changed their ethos regarding NL is hard e it
may relate to the trajectory of the study itself in that ward staff
were being continually encouraged to consider patient feedback
and the ﬁrst phase of this was problematic for them as it was novel.
It could be that ward teams were getting used to working with an
external research team rather than an in house quality improve-
ment facilitator and the different dynamic this entailed. Or it could
be related to broader cultural movement at the level of the orga-
nisation alongside a general political awakening of the importance
of the patient voice (Cornwell, 2015) which largely came to fruition
during the timescale of the study.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework for under-
standing why ward staff may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to respond to patient
feedback. Our framework helps us make sense of the interplays and
disjunctures between context (be that social, cultural or political)
and individuals working within organisational systems. It is
inherently embedded in a medical sociology analysis and offers up
explanatory factors which may impact on attempts to respond to
patient feedback. Therefore, wewould caution against our resultant
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ganisations which could lead to a reductionist re-appropriation of
its core messages.
5. Conclusion
Patient feedback is only likely to be acted upon when all the
levels of the PFRF are sufﬁciently in place, as appropriate to the
desired change. NL and SL are always needed to make change
happen but some teams require OR if the improvement necessi-
tates external assistance. We found that the majority of ward teams
possessed NL but SL appeared to be a problematic area for some
who were demoralised or in a state of staff ﬂux. For those where SL
was high, implementation of action plans largely depended on
whether the change was in the immediate control of the ward staff
themselves. When this was the case, improvement usually suc-
ceeded. Where SL was high but OR was required, improvement
usually failed. Poor OR was a major barrier to the realisation of
action plans in this study. A critical reason why ward staff fail to
progress with enacting change relates to insufﬁcient inter-
departmental working and high level systems which hinder
structural changes. This paper contributes to understanding the
landscape of patient feedback which to date has largely focused on
which data should be collected and how this should be conducted
rather than how staff can use feedback to improve care. The value of
collecting evermore data is questionable without a change to the
conditions under which staff ﬁnd it difﬁcult to respond.
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